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Recent historiography has suggested that historical interpretation of 
the various territories comprising southern Africa is enhanced if they are 
considered in the context of a "regional economic system etribracing all of 
southern Africa". (1) This is of particular significance when it is remembered 
that Cecil Rhodes's three main financial interests lay in Kimberley diamonds, 
Witwatersrand gold, and Southern Rhodesian mines and lands. (2) These interests 
were closely interlinked and developments within one field of operations 
normally affected the others. For example, Kimberley capital financed much of 
the early development on the Rand and, to a lesser degree, both centres invested 
in Southern Rhodesian mining. 
This paper will suggest that appreciation of the interaction between 
these financial interests is fundamental to an understanding of aspects of 
southern African history in the last decade of the 19th century. By outlining 
the history of one of Rhodes's interests, mining in Southern Rhodesia, together 
with his Rand investments, it is intended to provide a basis for a re-evaluation 
of Rhodes himself and a modification of existing analyses of the development of 
capitalist mining in Southern Rhodesia. 
Lockhart and Woodhouse, referring to Rhodes and the future Southern 
Rhodenia, have written that he "was not primarily interested in the gold or 
diamonds he might find in the north ... Rhodesfs real purpose, from which he 
never departea, was the extension of Cape Colony into Central Africa ... where 
men and women of the British race might work out a new destiny for themselves and 
their countxy". (5) Similarly, Leonard Thompson tells us that Rhodes "was not 
deeply hterested in wealth as such: he was interested in power". (4) Under- 
pinning these descriptions is the assumption that Rhodes is best interpreted as 
a politician who devoted his private fortune to the expansion of the British 
bpire. This type of analysis was somewhat refined in 1973 when Galbraith 
suggested that the element of Itego sati~faction~~/"self realisationf1 was central 
to Rhodes" life. Rhodes, Galbraith claims, "succeeded in deluding himself, as 
he convinced others, that his cause was Britain when in fact his cause was 
Rhodesw. But, for Galbraith, Rhodes's cause was realization of 'Ihimself through 
empirers, a cause which "far transcendedff the "business endst1 of his associates. 
Galbraith's contribution to the debate, therefore, was that Rhodes assisted the 
expansion of the British F$1Dire primarily for selfish, egotistical reasons, his 
ujmmortality would be Rhodesia". (5) 
The one notable exception to both analyses is Blaineyfs penetrating 
study of the Jameson Raid. Blainey concluded that Rhodes "was pursuing his own 
financial interests in the Rand at the expense of a united, British-oriented 
South Africau (6), and, presumably, at the expense of his untarnished 
ltimmortalityfl. This conclusion is both supported and supplemented by this 
paper's examination of the origin of Rhodes's Rand iriterests a d  their inter- 
action with his Southern Rhodesian investments. Rhodes emerges rather as a 
capitalist who, in maqy respects, utilized British Imperialism for the benefit 
of his private fortune. 
Just as the perspective of a regional economic system provides for a 
re-evaluatjon of Rhodes, so it lends itself to reinterpretation of the 
development of capitalist mining in Southern Rhodesia. It has been claimed that 
the "most important single element which determined the nature of economic and 
political development in Southern Rhodesia, has been the overestimation at the 
end of the 19th century of its mineral resources on the part of the British South 
Africa Company and the persistence of such an overestimation for rou&ly 15 
yearsft. (7) The lengthy persistence of this over-valuation is attributed to the 
"political interruptions" of the Jameson Raid of 1895, the African Risings of 
1896-7, and the Boer War of 1899-1902. (8) 
Examination of the growth of capitalist mining in Southern Rhodesia 
combined with a regional analysis, however, suggests that Rhodes - and to that 
extent the British South Africa Company (BSA ~ompany) - realized the comparative 
poverty of Southern Rhodesia's mineral resources by 1894-5, and that certain of 
the so-called "political interruptions" were in a number of respects a direct 
coasequence of the failure of the "Second Randtf to materialize between the 
Limpopo and the Zambezi. 
Rhodes and the Rand 
The initial development of Witwatersrand gold,after its discovery in 
1686 was primarily undertaken by Kimberley capitalists. Of considerable 
significance for southern Africa was the fact that Rhodes, unlike magnates such 
as J. B. Robinson, hesitated. The recent failure of the Barberton goldfield and 
the crash of its stock exchange bred in Rhodes and R u W  a "settled conviction 
that, however rich a gold-mining claim might be on the surface, there was no 
g-umantee that it would prove profitable at depth as the diamond-mines were 
proving to beH. (9) Rhodes" hesitation and distrust of the new goldfield - an 
opinion shred by his mining expert (10) - combined with an element of ill luck 
to cost him dearly. 
Their principal purchase in the west, Luipaardsvlei, was a low grade 
proposition though no one guessed it at the time. Their ground on Witpoortjie, 
the neighbouring farm, was situated on one of the great structural breaks of the 
Witwatersrand series. There was no trace of the reefs on the farms, Middelvlei, 
Droogeheuvel and Elandsvlei to the far west in which they acquired an interest. 
In the east, tney were later to buy Rietfontein and Witkoppie and run into  mini;^^ 
problems that baffled the mining engineers of the day. All in all, Cartmight 
concludes, Rhodes and Rudd "could scarcely have done worse had they deliberately 
set out to choose the most unpromising sections of the Witwatersrand on o r  near 
the outcropft. (11) 
h February 1887, The Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd was registered 
in London with a capital of S250,000. Rhodes had earlier stressed that Rudd 
should obtain "us a good remuneration or else the Company 2s not worth working 
forf1, and this Rudd certainly did. The two partners were to get three-fifteenyns 
of any profits the Company made, plus a further two-fifteenths in return for their 
services as managing directors. (12) But evidence of Rhodes's and Ruddf s 
miscalculations was not slow in coming. 
Early in 1887, one E. P. Mathers visited the Rand, where he saw a 20 
stamp battery already at work on Luipaardsvlei. Of this purchase by Rhodes, 
Fathers observed that "it remains to be seen whether this clever speculator has 
not ventured too much on surface indications.... A test crushing of 50 tons from 
this reef returned 13 dwts. of gold to the ton". (13) Other returns were even 
lower, and these and subsequent csushings of the Luipaards Vlei Estate arnd Gold 
Y L h h g  Company showed the mine to be a low grade proposition incapable of 
producing profits comparable to rich outcrop mines such as the Robinson. With 
over £100,000 of Gold Fields' capital sunk in mining properties and machinery, 
Rhodes and Rudd sought escape from their.faulty Witwatersrand investnents by 
placing the rest of the company's capital in De Beers and Kimberley Central 
diamond shares. (14) 
Clearly, Gold Fields of South Africa had failed to secure the rich 
outcrop reefs of the Rand, and it is in this context that Rhodes's grasp for 
the "northern goldfields" must be analysed. It was precisely because Rhodes had 
initially been unsuccessful. on the Transvaal Rand that he sought a '5econd Rand" 
nozth of the Limpopo to recoup his losses. In August 1888, following a 
pzrticularly stor@y axmual meeting with Gold Fields shareholders at which which 
nis brother had attempted to defend the managing directors' gyrations, Rudd 
explained to Curry that after "some discussion with Rhodes regarding The Gold 
Fields of South Africa we have come to the conclusion that our best chance of a 
big thing is to try and make some terms with Lobengula for a concession for the 
whole of his country". (15) 
With conswnmate and enduring duplicity, Rhodes's emissaries obtained 
the Rudd concession on 30 October 1888, and news of this achievement was 
circulated to delighted Gold Fields shareholders the following month. (16) The 
gxant of the Royal Charter for the BSA Company on 29 October 1889 cleared the 
way (17) for the subsequent expedition to Mashonaland, and, with the disbandment 
of the "pioneer column" at the end of September 1890, prospectors swarmed into 
the countryoide to locate the "Second Rand". 
Development and Disillusionment, 1890-1896/7 
"Rhodes ... thought we were discovering a Wittewaters- 
rand over again, that capital would pour into the 
country and the officials of his Company would be 
worried to death keeping check of the 50% streaming 
in like buckets of diamonds . . ." (18) 
Based on such an assumption, the Mashonaland Ylning Regulations, No 1, 
1890, were designed to promote the rapid development of gold mining by large 
companies, while ensuring the maximum benefit for the BSA Company. In or&er to 
attract capital, the regulations embodies the American apex principle (191, but 
the Chartered Company reserved prior right to company flotation and claimed 50 
per cent of such vendor's scrip. (20) Little wonder, then, that Rhodes ha~pily 
informed the Duke of Abercorn that the system was "an enormous thing for the 
Charter", as it "practically means ... we ... shall get h l f  the minerals of the 
country". (21) 
Fired with enthqzsiasm, the pmspectors spread over a wide area 
searching for gold: lTEveqbody- was going to make money quickly and everybody 
meant to meet everybody else at Chicago [~rade ~xhibition] - 'Chicam tgj?" (22) 
By the third week of October 1890, some 300 men were prospecting the country 
around forts Salisbury, Charter ancl Victoria, with particular emphasis on the 
Mazoe and Umfuli districts which Thomas Baines had described. Already 465 gold 
claims had been registered and shaft-sinking comenced. (23) The favoured region 
of Hartley Hills soon bristled with claim pegs and the'firm of Johnson, Heany and 
Borrow confidently applied for watellirights for 1,730 head of crushing stanps. (24) 
But this initial momentum swiftly collapsed with the onset of the rains, 
which severed communication with the south for three to four months. At the sane 
time, the prospectors' gold fever was supplanted by malerial fever, which 
considerably hampered mining work. (25) The deteriorating situation compelled 
the Company's Administrator to write to Kimberley seeking urgent relief, as the 
Itwant of food supplies, tool and barter stuff for securing supplies, labour etc 
from Yashonas has been very serious [and] it has not only caused much discontent 
but retarded progress greatlyq'. (26) In addition, many prospectors had b ~ e n  
obliged by the terms of the mining regulations to assist the Chartered Company in 
i - t ~  seizure of the reputedly rich Manica goldfields. Consequently, it was not 
until July 1891 that regular mining development was possible. (27) 
Nevertheless, sufficient exploration had been undertaken to reveal 
features of a more durable nature. Problems encountered twenty years earlier 
on the TaLi goldfield were found to be similarly characteristic of Chartered 
Compaqr territory but on a more massive scale. Those prospectors who had 
dreamed of large-scale alluvial deposits soon learned better; one group jn the 
Mazoe valley, after three days of strenuous work, were rewarded with only a 
quarter of a, pennyweight of gold. (28) Others, who turned to reefs, were 
disturbed by signs of extensive pre-colonial goldworkings which fostered the 
wleasy suspicion that the "ancients11 had "picked the eyes" out of the country. 
The first mining level of the Antenior Mine, for example, had to be made at 150 
feet because the "ancients" ha& earlier removed all the gold-bearing quartz dom 
to that level. ( 2 9 )  This feature was later considered to be a major ~bstacle to 
raising capital for Southern Rhodesia because, unlike the Ra32d, where the rich 
outcrops were untouched, development of Rhodesian mines necessitated expenditure 
of relatively more time and money before they could begin gold Sroduction. "The 
Rand", Wilson Fox lamented, "has been payable from the surface and in several 
cases the mines themselves have paid out of profits for practically the whole 
of their present magnificent equipment and developmentn. (30) 
Reopening of communication with the south in 1891 brought a certain 
renewal of confidenca and numbers of fresh gold-seekers, including both 
Lndividuals and companies. Kimberley and London capital was well represented 
in the latter expeditions, among whom were Lord Randolph Churchill, Albert Grey, 
Beit, Maund, and Major Brown of De Beers. (31) Even as the newcomers arrived, 
however, so discontent with the Chartered Companygs 50 per cent clause was 
growing as miners realized the nature of Mashonaland goldfields. Not only were 
they faced with the uncertainties of quartz reef mining, but reefs which had 
previously been worked imposed limitations on profitability and postponed hopes 
of swift returns. (32) The first reports by mining expests were similarly 
discouraging, especially that of Perkins, Churchill~s engineer, and even the 
Chartered Company man, Rolker, was decidedly cautiaus in his assessment. (33) 
Economic depression followed swiftly on the publication of these 
adverse opinions: "At present evesything is stapation. Economy the order of 
the day in eveqy household.. . . The whole concern Pas the appearance of lan] 
enormous bladtd] er unduly inflated & suddenly pricked. One mi&t say that the 
experts were the people who have pricked it.!' (34) In Manica, the depression 
was so pronounced that ma,ny prospectors could only just pWchase food, let alone 
develop their properties. (35)  As a result, the BSA Compczny was compelled to 
reduce expenditure considerably, and this was done primarily by reducing the 
expensive police establishment. This in turn, as Ranger has explained, forced 
the Chartered Administration to rely heavily upon the settlers for a wide range 
of activities, including those of Field Cornets and the exaction of "fines", (36) 
Thus, the system of "administmtion1' and the ensuing stream of abuses whtch 
ultimately culminated in the African risings of 1896-7 were in man;y respects a 
airect consequence of impecuniosity stemming from failure to discover a "Second 
Randt1 in Mashonaland, and later, MAtabeleland, 
Continuation of exploration and development in 1892 seemingly confirmed 
the adverse reports of the mining eqerts. A gold production for that year of 
on ly  779 ozs served to show that wherever the "Second Rand" was, it did not lie 
within Mashonaland. 
In Eq 1893, Jameson, the Chartered Compaa.yrs Administrator, 
telegraphed London: "Everywhere new finds are occurring daily. Crushing 
everywhere successful. Wonderful developments in every district. Reefs certainly 
improve as depth increases. (37)  But Jaanesonf S extravagant language could not 
disguise the fact that in 1892 only two companies had been floated for work on 
mining claims. Although the first three months of l893 saw the flotation of four 
more mining companies, all the BSA Company received was shares to the nominal 
value of £116,270. (38) With such meagre returns, the Chartered Compaay was 
sinking into debt as its "cash and reserve of shares were almost exhausted adlit 
was living on a monthly subsidy from De Beers and other friends". (39) 
Rhodes's faltering investment was further threatened in mid-July 1893 
when the Ndebele raided in the Victoria district, particularly as the raid 
disrupted the labour supply of the only two producing gold mines in the country. 
With BSA Company finances already unsatisfactory, the mere hint of trouble with 
the Ndebele caused Chartered Shares to fall rapidly. (40) One magazine reported 
that the "diffi~ulties~~ with the Ndebele around Victoria had "created a feeling 
of uneasiness, and Chartereds have suffered in consequenceq'. (41) For a company 
in the parlous financial position of the BSA Company, it was clear that 
persistence of this "uneasiness" would mean its collapse, especially as no rich 
gold d_iscoveries had been made in Mashonaland. 
Initially, Rhodes and Jameson were reluctant to u-bllize the incident 
to countenance the invasion of Matabeleland, as both were highly conscious of 
the BSA Company's weak financial situation. But at a more significant level it 
was precisely because of the Chartered Company's financial weakness that war was 
seen as a solution to compelling and complex financial pressures. (42) 
The successful dispersion of the Ndebele force in the Victoria district 
on the 18th July indicated the possibility of a cheap confrontation with 
Lobengula and, indeed, the subsequent campaign was fought as cheaply as possible 
by utilizing settler volunteers, with Imperial troops in Bechuanalavld providing 
a valuable back-up. (43) From the end of July 1893, the Chartered Company- set 
out to manufacture a war for the seizure of Matabelelazzd and at the same time 
the directors of the United Concessions Company (who oped the Rudd concession) 
arranged that,if the previously postponed purchase of the Concession could be 
pushed through before the end of the year, they would raise a £$"j'O,OOO loan for 
the BSA Compw, (44) 
As Jameson realized, "the getting Matabeleland open would give us a 
tremendous lift in Shares and everything else. The fact of its beisyl; shut up 
gives it an immense value both here and outsidett. (45) It would seem that the 
war with the Ndebele solved several problems: the "uncertainty" which was 
depressing Chartered Shares was ultimately removed, and it also provided access 
to the reputedly rich lbtabeleland goldfields. Further, the conclusion of the 
war created a more favourable financial climate for purchase of the Rudd 
Concession, and by laying the basis for a rise in shares, offered the directors 
of United Concessions the chaxtce of a reasonable profit. In this sense, lJalker 
was correct in observing that froa the end of July "it was either Lobewlats 
head or the Company! sl1. (46) 
Lobengula's head duly fell, and the Rudd Concession was purchased from 
the United Concessions Company at the price of doubling the Chartered Company~s 
shaxe capital. This time the Shareholders raised no objection, despite a 
temporary fall in share values, satiated as they were by the prospects of "two or 
the Wew Joha.nnesburgsl' in Matabeleland. The BSA Company was able to raise not 
£170,000 but a three-quarter million pound loan, interest first pwable in 
1896. (47) 
The sellers of the Concession received one million Chartered shares, 
their market value being just over one million pounds. Significantly, the 
controlling interest in United Concessions had been held by Gold Fields, Rhodes 
and his associates, and it is to Rhodes's Rand holdings that we must now turn. 
Blhodes and Rudd had invested about four-fifths of Gold Fields of South 
Africa's capital in diamond shares and the BSA Company, in an attempt to 
compensate for their faulty Witwatersrand purchases. For a time it seemed as if 
even dimonds were a risky investment because the discovery of a new deposit 
obliged De Beers to spend £451,438 for control of the new mine. De Beers shares 
fell into temporary disfavour because of the risk that if new diamond mines 
continued to be discovered it would be very dLfficult to control output a d  keep 
the price of diamonds up. Because of Gold Fields close connection with De Beers, 
the former's prospects declined accordingly and in 1891 the company. returned 
profits of only some £16,000 and no dividend. (48) 
The managing directors8 search for profits north of the Limpopo had 
already involved the increase of Gold Fieldsbapital to £370,000 by the creation 
of 120,000 £1 shares for the development of the Rudd Concession. (49) The extent 
to which the fortmes of Gold Fields were linked to those of the BSA Company was 
revealed by Rudd in January 1891: *l... we have so far decided to concent~ate ail 
, 
our forces in Mashonaland - both capital, engineers ... and everything else that 
can be brought to bear are to be sent up there in April.... This being the case 
it is useless to pretend that we desire new business on the Rand because we have 
not the capital for it . . .l1 (50) 
With uncertainty shrouding dianond shares, the only alternative for 
Gold Fields was seemingly to exploit its interest in Mashonaland, a d  there all 
the promisinplooking gold claims at this time were held by the firm of Johnson, 
Heany and Borrow. In a venture described by Cartmight as "a somewhat desperate 
effort to improve the look of things", Bhodes arranged to raise £130,000 through 
Gold Fields to work Johnson arnd Compaqyts assets in conjunction with them, Gold 
Fields shareholders objected strongly to this latest proposition, and, of the 
130,000 shares of the new issue offered to them, subscribed Tor only 44,000. (51) 
Here shaxeholders displayed considerably more acumen than the directors, because 
the venture was a financial. failure. 
Thus, by the beginning of 1892, Gold Fieldst association with the BSA 
Company and its territory was proving distinctly unprofitable. Serious doubts 
had already been voiced as the richness of the galdfields,and Mashonaland itself 
was economically depressed. On the Rand, however, two developments had occurred 
which were to refocus Rhodesfs and Rudd's attention on that goldfield. 
Firstly, the MazArthur-Forrest cyanide process had solved the problem 
of extracting pld from pyrite ore, and at the same time had given the Rand mines 
a greatly improved return per ton. Of much greater long-tern significance was 
the second development - the formulation of the "deep-level theory" and the 
beginnings of exploratory drilling. But, like many other mining companies and 
Sr:v~s1Lo;7s4 Gold Fields did not initially accept the deep-level theory, even 
thou& their own consulting engineer, Tarbutt, was convinced of its viability 
and pegged nwnerous claims on his own account. (52) 
Most of the deep-level claims were cornered by Wernher, Beit & Co., and it 
was only tbou& the latter that Gold Fields was saved "from the ignominy they 
would have had to face had they been left out of the deep-level boom". In 1892 
Gold Fields accepted a share in what was to become the immensely profitable Rand 
Mines I;td, but there was good. reason for Beit's apparent generosity. Development 
of deep level mines was obviously going to involve a considerable mount of 
capital, and this Beit hoped to raise on the London market in association with 
the influential. Rhodes. (53) 
Eben as Rhodes a;nd Rudd swung back to interest in the Raqd, their hopes 
of buying more deep-level claims were frustrated by Gold Fields1 unsatisfactory 
financial position. As Rudd explained to Curry in July 1892: "The fact is our 
total Mashonaland holding is discredited, our De Beers depreciated and the deep 
level interests are looked upon as speculative and visionary and with an utter 
absence of confidence and speculation generally . . .l1 (54) The problem of raisim 
capital was resolved by amalgamating the interests of Gold Fields of South Africa 
with three other smaller companies who held good deel-level interests. From this 
amalgamation, Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd emerged in August 1892, 
with a capital of £1,250,000. (55) 
The new company was heavily committed to the development of its deep- 
level interests, which, as noted, required extremely heavy capital investment. 
The close association of Gold Fields with the BSA Company was undisturbed by the 
amalgamation of August 1892, and was underscored from July 1893 onwards when 
Consoldiated Gold Fields shaxes began to fall in sympathy with Charteredfs. (56) 
Undoubtedly, this factor S v e  Rhodes added (if not incentive for 
manufacturing war with the Ndebele. (57) 
The successful prosecution of the Ndebele War promised a marked 
improvement in the financial position of Rhodes~s various interests, and for the 
BSA Company in particular the future looked bright. Nashonaland goldfields were 
almost abandoned as hopes of wealth were transferred to Matabeleland and capital 
raised. At the end of March 1894, the Chartered Compan~r reported that "a sum 
of over half a million has, within the last few months, been subscribed in cash 
by independent Companies, as working capital for new mining ventures . . . " . (58) 
This trend was more than sustained, and in 1895 BSA Company directors stated 
that "many Development Companies have been floated, thus providing further large 
mounts of working capital for ... the development of the country". With about 
two hundred such companies in the country, BSA Company shares were quoted at 
£8.17.6. on the Bulawayo stock exchange. (59) 
Between 1894 and early 1896 the mineral resources of Chartered territory 
were certainly overestimated by nmerous companies and shareholders in a period 
characterized by speculation. The main reason for this speculation was not so 
much overvalination of the territory's resources, however, but the important fact 
that the Rhodesian share-market was very closely linked to that of the Rand. In 
early 1892, Rudd had complained to Borrow that one of the reasons why it was so 
difficult to raise capital for Chartered territory was that "the Rand at present 
low prices offers such excellent opportunity fox investment on a safe & 
semmerative basis, that no investor or speculator need go further ...". Once 
the "boom" came to the Rand, all that Rudd could hope for was that '"hen no 
doubt we shall get the reflected glory of the Rand in a substantia.1 form, but 
this inay be delayed a year or even two". (60) Blainey has explained that in the 
"long spells of cheap money that punctuated the decade 1886-95 Europeans 
invested more heavily in gold shares than ever before", and especially in the Rand, 
which was on the crest of a boom between 1894 and 1895. (61) 
It is probable that much of the capital entering Chartered territory 
in these years reflected the prosperity of the mining regional economy as a 
whole. For example, the general prosperity enabled speculators to redirect 
capital for the partial resuscitation of the previously discredited Mashonaland 
goldfields. For Mashonaland miners this meant that a "great & beautiful change 
h$ come over the country & that is that now buyers run after claimholders whilst 
not long ago it was the other way round". (62) Such a development would not have 
been possible purely on the basis of overestimation, especially as no new 
startling gold discoveries had been made in Mashonaland. 
This suggestion that the flow of capital represented something more tlnan. 
simple overvaluation of gold deposits is supported by two other features. In 
Mashonald the failure of gold had increased the value of the other potential 
source of income - land - and speculation in land was accentuated after the 
occupation of Matabelelad. (63) Had the companies concerned felt confident in 
the territory's gold resources, it is unlikely that thqy would have indulged in 
land speculation to the extent they did, nor would the BSA Company have felt 
constrained to make lavish land grants to m a n y  companies in order to encourage 
investment. (64) Similarly, the settlers themselves had learnt from their 
Mashonaland experiences a d  were cautious about prospects in Matabeleland: "A 
lot of people are going to Matabeleland more because there is nothing doing here 
than that they expect to make much there." (65) 
The two strands of overestimation and the prosperity of the regional 
mining economy ran together, manifesting themselves in incompetent, expensive 
managements and often in fraudulent company speculation, and both took advantage 
of the fact that ordinary British shareholders did not or could not always 
distinguish between "Kaffirs", the term for both Rand and Bodesian mining 
shares. The Rlodesia Herald complained bitterly that for "nine months of each 
year the development of auriferous Mashonaland is gravely performed by cable and 
telegraph", m d  called repeatedly for the cormnencement of serious mining 
development. (66) Such behaviour was a further indication that speculation was 
riding on the back of Rand prosperity and that many companies had little faitn in 
the territory's mineral resources. Indeed, as one visitor was informed, "when 
output begins speculation ceases". (67) 
By this time, however, Rhodes no longer entertained any illusions as to 
where the "Second Ra;ndtf lay. He had asked John Hays Hammond, Consolidated Gold 
Fields' mining expert, to visit Southe- Rhodesia and report on its mining 
prospects. Hammondts report, completed by November 1894, made it clear that 
Southern Rhodesian goldfields were no "Second Rand". 
Hmmond related that when he submitted his report, Rutherfoord Ramis, 
the BSA Companyvs secretary, commented: "if we have to depend on Hammondts 
geological report to raise money for this country, J donlt think the outlook is 
e~couraging." But Rhodes was too astute a capitalist to disregard or attempt to 
sontradict the report, which he allowed to be published. Instead, when 
addressing the fourth Annual Meeting of the Chartered Company in early 1895, he 
sixccessfully distorted the tenor of the report and left a glowing impression of 
D"t~unbeds of miles of mineralized veinst',which had the shareholders cheering. (68) 
"It was of supreme importance to Rhodes", wmte Hammond, "that m y  
report be favourable - on my findings would hinge the investment or the norl- 
investment of enormous sums of British capital for the development of the 
countqy." (69) Hammond overestimated the importance of his finan@ for Southern 
Rhodesia in the short-term; so long as the Rand boom continued and prosperity 
percolated through the regional economy (and so long as the true import of his 
findings continued distorted), so capital continued to be raised for Chartered 
territo~j. But for Rhodes, as a capitalist straddling three financial interests, 
the report undoubtedly was of supreme importance. &. 
By 1894, the deep-level theorjr on the Rand had been proved beyond any. 
doubt and the companies concerned were sinking more and more capital into the 
development of these mines. For Rhodes, Harmnondls report must have emphasized 
that the true ''Second Rmd" lay in the deep-levels and not in Southern Rhodesia.(70) 
The failure of Charrtered territory to provide immensely rich goldfields 
considerably accentuated Rhodes's interest in and dependence on deep-level mining, 
a point not mentioned by Blainey but one which supports his analysis. 
- I 
Details of Blaineyfs study of the Jameson Raid are not repeated here; 
suffice it to say that a combination of the disadvantageous economic position of 
the deep-level Rand. interests, together with the comparative poverty of his 
Southern Rhodesian investments, gave Rhodes sufficient motive as a capitalist to 
plan action against the Transvaal gavernment. The progressive collapse of the 
boom in Kaffirs after September 1895, Blainey suggests, may have "accelerate3 plaas 
for the revolt and made Dr Jameson more impetuous and Rhodes less cautious ...". 
The swift overthrow of Emger, Blainey adds, "would loosen the economic yoke that 
choked deep-level mines and would instal a sympathetic government that might 
revive the confidence of European speculatorsll. (71) Inasmuch as the illusory 
prosperity of Chartered territory depended on the maintenance of the region& 
mining boom, this gave Rhodes added incentive for the Jameson Raid, especially 
as interest on loans raised for the BSA Company after the 1893 BTdebele War fell 
due on the 1st January 1896. (72) Far from the Jamesor: Raid obscuring over- 
estimation of the BSA Companyls mineral resources, in a number of respects 
their comparative poverty contributed to its causes. 
The removal of troops and police from Southern Ehodesia for the Raid 
presented the territory's African people with an,idefil opportunity to rise 
against the settlers and the Chartered Company. Previous reference has been 
made to the "administrative systemt1 which sesulted,from financial stringency in 
the early 1890s, following failure to locate rich go18 deposits. From this 
stemmed a wide vasiety of abuses which were not reduced but rather institutionalized 
when a rudimentary ltNativelf Department was set up in 1894. The comparative 
poverty of the mineral resouces induced companies and settlers to indulge, among 
other activities, in land speculation and cattle confiscation, the latter in 
particular having a severe impact on the Ndebele, especially as it was 
accelerated in the months immediately prece6ing the risings. (73) These and 
other factors combined to produce the Risings, which, from a beginning in April 
1896, persisted in various areas until near the end of 1897, an6 at their height, 
with the exception of the TJmtali district, brought's complete halt to mining 
development. 
Conclusion 
-- 
In the introduction to his sthmlating study on 'sWorIcer Consciousness1', 
van Onselen emphasized t m t  previous observations concerning African labour in 
Southern Rhodesia had in no case been "based on a thorough examination of African 
responses in a particular industry1!. (74) Remarkably, despite the considerable 
attention paid by historians to the career of Cecil Rhodes, it would seem that 
equally their studies have been based on no more than a cu~.sory glance at Rhodes's 
finaacial interests, and especially the interaction between them, Tlhodesfs 
amalgamtion of the diamond mines, certainly, has been written about extensively, 
but most historians have assumed that his success here was simply transferred to 
the R d ,  or, at the very most, that he was frustrated in his desire to amalgamate 
the Band inines as he did the diamond workings. Acting on the assumption that 
Rhode~tn finances were securely based on the riches of Kimberley and the Rand, 
hiatorirtno have then generally interpreted Rhodests northern activities primarily 
in terms of the expansion of the British Empire, wkther for reasons of southern 
African politics and/or for Ifego satisfactionl1. (75) Only Blainey undertook the 
systematic probing of one of Rhodes's financial interests, but even he did no more 
than hint at the powerful links between Rhodes's main investments. 
Probably elements of llself-realizationll and commitment to imperialism 
were powerful influences in Rhodes's career, but, as Blainey and this paper have 
indicated, both were abandoned when they threatened to conflict with the demands 
of Rhodes's investments. Faulty investments on the Rand and the need to 
compensate for these provided Rhodes with the main impetus for his interests 
between the Limpopo and the Zambezi. Similarly, his cautious railway policies 
were primarily grounded on the necessity to succour prior capital investment and, 
later, on hopes of profitability. (76) While this paper does not claim to have 
examined thoroughly Rhodests financial interests, it does seem that an economic 
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analysis goes some way to providing a basis for re-evaluation of Rhodes. 
Because of the predominant economic position of the Rand, together with 
Rhodesrs regional investments, this paper has further attempted to show that the 
development of capitalist mining in Southern Rhodesia is best understood in the 
con-text of the regional economic system postulated by van Onselen. It would 
seem that the limitations of previous studies are related to their interpretations 
being confined to a narrow territorial base. Detailed exmxbation of the growth 
of capitalist mining in Southern Rhodesia, combined with appreciation of 
regional interests, has shown the overvaluation of mineral resources to have been 
of much shorter duration than some studies have suggested. Indeed, the 
l1politica1 interruptions" characteristic of the period were in .many respects a 
consequence of realization of the comparative poverty of Southern Rhodesiaes gold 
deposits. 
------oo------ 
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